It is generally acknowledged that the Dornbusch 2 sticky price monetarist model -also called overshooting model -represents a major contribution to exchange rate theory in the sense that departures from purchasing power parity and vola tile currency levels can be explained rationally.
bear the same drawbacks. Part II sets up the overshooting model in a secular inflationary dual framework by relaxing the two original assumptions of constant prices and small country. Part III shows that the exchange rate disequilibrium depends on the same real interest rate differential as with Frankel. Part IV points out the main theoretical pitfall met by both models.
II) T HE M ODEL
The model we develop here draws much on the sticky price model. But unlike Dornbusch, we don't assume that the domestic country is small, so that the rest of the world, represented as a foreign country, faces comparable money and goods markets. Furthermore, we will not suppose that the exogeneous variables are constant.
However investors will still be indifferent between home and abroad in their money lending or borrowing because they are supposed neutral with respect to the risk of currency depreciation.
II.1 Uncovered Interest Parity
Capital is perfectly mobile so that investors can instantly alter the composition of their international investments. Besides they regard domestic and foreign interest bearing assets, that we will name bonds, as equally risky. Because in our simple framework there is one horizon length, one national rate and one national issuer, equal riskiness boils down to investors' risk neutrality with respect to exchange rate volatility. Hence we can say that domestic and foreign bonds are perfect substitutes. This yields the following relationship:
where r and r * are the domestic and foreign nominal interest rates, and E(x ) is the expected depreciation rate of the domestic currency.
If e is the log of the exchange rate of the domestic currency, i.e. the domestic price of one unit of foreign currency, E(x ) can be ex pressed as E(x ) = E( dt de ) = E(e )
provided that the interest rates are instantaneous.
( 1 ) is known as the Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP), and derives its qualifier uncovered from the fact that risk neutral investors don't hedge -cover -their foreign belongings.
UIP holds continuously in the model.
II.2 Purchasing Power Parity Departure and Expectations Formation
Contrary to UIP, the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) holds only in the long run. It doesn't in the short because, for example after a monetary shock, prices and wages adjust much slower than the exchange rate.
Hence we first need to posit (absolute) PPP in the long run:
where e , p and p * are the logs of the equilibrium spot rate, price at home and price abroad. Note that e , p and p * are not held constant as in Dornbusch, and are implicitly indexed with time, i.e. e t , p t and * t p .
Dif ferentiating (PPP) provides:
where x = e & , Π = p & , and Π * = * p & . This means that the currency depreciation is equal to the inflation differential.
Although x , Π and Π * need not be constant, it may be useful to look at the stationary case where e , p and p * evolve at constant growth rates to better un derstand how they can be non constant in the long run. Now suppose that for some reason PPP is violated. We can measure the d e parture from PPP as:
e -p + p * which is frequently called the PPP gap or real exchange rate or else terms of trade, and that can be expressed with the variables' rates of increase:
We postulate that in the long run the economy is stable and PPP gap vanis hes through time under price pressure from imported goods.
We then relate the short term track of the exchange rate to the anticipated closure of PPP gap:
The larger the departure from PPP, the wider the spread between spot and equilibrium rates -which we name EER gap in this paper 5 -. θ must be positive for stability concern, for example home currency must be cheap to offset an excess domestic infla tion 6 .
Because in the long-run agents perfectly understand the economy, E(Π ) =
Π and E(Π *) = Π *, and (2) becomes
We can read this relationship in terms of expectations formation. Agents expect the home currency depreciation to fit a long term trend plus any corrective path due to some disturbance. The long term trend obtains when e = e and goes with the perfect foresight E(x ) = x :
( 2'') is simply the long term (PPP).
Note that in the long range we can write (UIP) as:
which combined with (2'') provides the real interest rate parity (RIP) in the long-run:
Combining (1) e -e = -?
from which Frankel's work has been labelled ''real interest differential model''.
Note however that r -Π is not exactly the real interest rate since Π is not the expected current inflation E(p ) but is the underlying long run inflation.
We will address this issue further down in this paper.
II.3 The Money Market
The domestic demand to hold real money balance is given continuously by the conventional loga rithmic function φy -λr which, equated to the real money supply from the central bank, yields:
where m , p and y denote the logs of respectively the nominal money is - In the long range, (4 ) becomes:
The same money function applies abroad:
Subtracting (4 ) from (4 ), and (4 * ) from (4*), brings two equalities:
Replacing r* -r by Π -Π * in the above equality yields:
and with (3 ) we gets:
This is a key equation as it relates the exchange rate to the relative price l e vel departure from its long run trend.
II.4 The Goods Market
The function depicting the demand for domestic goods in an open economy is classic:
where d is the logarithm of the demand D and u embodies the autonomous spending.
At equilibrium supply Y meets demand D, which is the (IS) basics. But reaching equilibrium takes time in our model where prices are sticky. Hence after a disturbance, (7 ) is violated in the short run and generates an excess demand. We suppose that excess demand D -Y gives rise to an instantaneous short-term infla tion p in the following way:
At equilibrium, we get p & = Π and hence
so we can rewrite (8 ) as
Price disequilibrium depends on both PPP gap and interest rate disequilibrium. This results differs from Frankel's assumption where excess inflation is r e lated solely to PPP gap. Now the same demand function prevails abroad and so we get similar identi ties:
Subtracting (8 * ' ) from (8 ) provides:
which with (5 ) becomes:
We need to relate the PPP gap to the relative price disequilibrium to get a simple differential equation. This can be achieved through a little algebra. Subtracting (4 * ) from (4 ) brings:
and in the long run:
and by subtracting the latter from the former:
Using (PPP) and (RIP) in order to substitute p -p * with e and r -r * with Π -Π *, we get:
Dividing the two hand sides of this equation with the respective hand sides of (3 ) yields: 
which with (6 ) gives the promised relation:
Replacing PPP gap in (9 ) with its relative price departure equivalent, we o b tain a simple differential equation:
where υ = ??
and whose solution is:
υ can be interpreted as a rate of convergence of the relative price towards its equilibrium path.
II.5 Consistency Condition
( 6 ) shows that the currency follows the same type of convergence:
Home currency depreciates to catch up its long-term path as long as the price differential is above its equi librium level.
Taking the time derivative of (14) -e = e -υ / λθ ( e 0 -e 0 )e -υ t -, recalling that e = x and e & = x , and using (PPP'), we end up with:
Comparing the latter equality with expectation path description (2') entails that expectations fit realizations only when θ equals υ . 
The only difference with Dornbusch's result is that δ is replaced by 2 δ, which is the effect of our two-country framework. It is worth noting that .
relaxing the hypothesis of constant equilibrium values has no incidence there.
When expectations meet realizations, it means that economic agents have a perfect foresight. This strong assumption reduces the attractiveness of the model as it doesn't show very much realistic. A more appealing model would allow some error in predictions, but without persistent bias relative to outcomes. Agents would then feed rational expectations. To our knowledge, no stochastic setting of the Dornbusch or Frankel's models has been proposed so far 7 .
Last, if (16) is a necessary condition for model consistency, nothing tells us that it is also sufficient. We will see a complete discussion about this issue in Part IV.
II.6 Conclusion
We have generalized Dornbusch's overshooting model by relaxing the hypotheses of a small country with constant secular macroeconomic variables, and by assuming a force pulling back the exchange rate towards not a given level but a dynamic equilibrium trajectory. Yet we have found the same kind of behaviour for the relative price and the exchange rate, that is to say an exponentional convergence (in log terms) towards the long-run underlying equilibrium path.
However we will see in Part IV that Dornbusch's original model is not so r o bust when facing a more realistic stance.
III) D ORNBUSCH' S I MPLIED R EAL I NTEREST R ATES D IFFERENTIAL
The real interest differential mo del shown in:
may not deserve its name since the real rates are not computed with the actual inflations p and p*, but with the underlying long-term inflations Π and Π *. Nevertheless after handling out a set of equations Frankel derives from his model that the equilibrium exchange rate departure -or EER gap -is linearly dependent on the real interest differential involving current inflations.
We will see below that Dornbusch's generalized model leads to the same kind of relationship. We warn the reader that the algebra involved is simple but so mewhat cumbersome.
III.1 Linking the Real Rates Differential to the EER and PPP Gaps
Our first computational objective is to gather the EER gap, PPP gap and real interest differential into a single identity.
First recall the long-term (RIP) :
and combine it with (3 ) to get:
Plugging (3') into (10) yields:
that is, PPP gap is linearly related to the pseudo-real rates difference. Now use again (RIP) with equation (8 *'' ) by subsituting r -r* with Π -Π * :
and use (3') to express Π -Π * without the pseudo-real rates spread:
Then replace this equivalent value of Π -Π * in (18) :
Collecting PPP gap terms gives:
This is the first identity we were looking for. Frankel finds a similar result but without the σπθ ( e -e ) term. This difference stems from his simpler as -sumption about the goods market. Indeed Frankel's pull back forces follow the pro cess: 
III.2 The Real Interest Rate Differential at Work
Eliminating Π -Π * from (3') by using its value from (18), we find:
and replacing the PPP gap by its value from (19) brings, after rearranging the real rate differential and the EER gap terms in the right hand side:
Finally, we get the linear relationship 9 :
e -e = -) ) (
Frankel's similar relationship coefficient is equal to 1/[θ +2δπ(1+λθ )] and clearly adding up (1+πσ) reflects our taking account of the current interest rate in the goods market short-term dynamics.
The main finding in Part III is that the enlarged Dornbusch model delivers one of the main result from Frankel, i.e. that the real interest rates differential drives the currency spot.
IV) S TABILITY D ISCUSSION
A major weakness in our approach is that it has injected a ad hoc link (2 ) between PPP gap and EER gap into a classic IS-LM model in an open eco -nomy and with perfectly mobile capital 10 , without checking whether the model is by itself suffi cient to provide such a link or an alternative one.
In what follows we get a sense of our model from a Control Science perspective. Without supposing that the expectation formation ( 2 ) holds ex ante, we will analyze how an economy whose agents have perfect foresight can be sta ble.
IV.1 The State and Control Variables of the Model
We can think of the long-term variables, depicted with an upbar, as being the engine of the world economy and as well as a planner constraining it to stick to some route. The short-term variables, they, then describe how the eco nomy reacts to once-and-for-all external shocks.
The economy will be considered as a system described by a subset of nonredundant short-term variables -termed the state variables -and forced by fundamental variables -termed the control variables -to follow some trajec tory.
State variables are to be drawn from equations (1 ), (4 ) 
and recall that perfect foresight means that E(x ) = x .
The vector composed of (r ; r * ;p ;p * ;e ) is a straightforward candidate to become state variables, but by first collapsing the above system we will 10 See for example the Mundell-Fleming model. then solve it more easily. We observe that the system can be expressed in terms of current exchange rate and price relative by eliminating the nominal interest rate dif ferential. Indeed: (4 ) -(4 * ) and (1 ) yield respectively:
( r -r *) = e
( 21) allows to express r -r * in terms of prices and exogenous variables:
which, when replaced in (22) and (20) provides:
Now restate this set of two equations in the long-run:
Subtracting the equations in underlying long-run variables from the corresponding equations in current variables gives:
This is a system that can be represented in matrix form:
where:
is the vector of state variables and A is a time invariant matrix. (25) is also called the state equation. Notice that X( t ) is a vector of gap variables. We now turn to sol ving the equation.
IV.2 Solving for the State Equation
The state equation reveals a linear continuous-time system free of constaint and whose state variables can be readily expressed as functions of time 11 . The solu tion of (25) is:
e At can be computed with the Sylvester method which consists in setting the fol lowing determinant equal to zero: where -θ 1 and -θ 2 are the eigenvalues of matrix A, thus satisfying:
( 27) leads to the same equation as (15) whose roots are:
Hence (26) yields:
(-θ 1 e -θ 2 t + θ 2 e -θ 1 t )Ι -(e -θ 2 t -e -θ 1 t )A + (-θ 2 + θ 1 )e At = 0 and therefore we have: e -e = a1 e -θ 1 t + a2 e -θ 2 t and p -p -(p * -p *) = b1 e -θ 1 t + b2 e -θ 2 t
From a mathematical standpoint, (28) is weaker than (6 ), and therefore the model gains in generality by assuming (28) rather than (6 ) or equivalently (2 ). But this doesn't make sense from an economic point of view, for ( 28) is too specific. Indeed, what is the economic rationale for assuming (6 ) or equivalently (2 ) only at time t = 0 and not later ? We don't see any, and so probably did Dorn busch when he posits (2 ) at anytime.
IV.3 About Frankel's approach
Following Frankel we could have described the economy with (23) and ( 24), that is with a set of variables which are not gaps. The economy can then be repre sented in the following matrix form:
where: ∫e A(t -τ) B(τ)U(τ)dτ can prove to be difficult to obtain and chiefly has no reason to be fully made of terms in e -θ 1 t and e -θ 2 t . For instance, suppose the long-run economy grows at steady rates, and in particular exhibits steady inflations Π and Π *. Then p and p * are linear functions of time and ∫e A(t -τ) B(τ)U(τ)dτ car ries terms in te -θ 1 t and te -θ 2 t .
Therefore approaching the problem with non-gap variables, as Frankel did, doesn't allow to assess that the endogenous variables -in logs for the exchange rate and prices -converge exponentially to their long-term equilibrium values 13 .
Yet there exists one special case where it is allowed: this is when all exogenous variables are held constant. But we then get back to Dornbusch's frame work.
V.Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that by using the same model as Dornbusch's but without its restrictive assumptions of no growth in the long-run macroeconomic variables and of a small country, we keep the same kind of results as with the original model and moreover as with Frankel's ''real interest rate model''. Briefly speaking, setting Dornbusch model in motion brings Frankel model.
Unfortunately, we also have proved that the expectations formation process at the heart of both models is unlikely to hold endogenously.
